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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between dollarization and banking stability in 
Ecuador. Through an econometric analysis I find that the main variables that affect banking 
stability in Ecuador are GDP, liquidity, financial efficiency, the proportion of productive 
assets, the percentage of past-due loans, the ratio between total assets and total liabilities, 
and the degree of concentration of the banking sector. All these variables have improved 
in the past decade thus strengthening banking stability. Furthermore, the four main effects 
of dollarization on a small, open, and developing economy include: i) the statistically 
significant decrease in inflation, ii) the removal of the figure of the lender of last resort, 
iii) the removal of currency risk, and iv) the increased credibility of regulatory 
institutions. These positive effects are proven to have a direct connection to independent 
variables, and thus on financial stability. 
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Introduction 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the world had reached an unprecedented level of 
financial integration.  World stock exchanges were interconnected to the point that, with 
one click, a broker in England could buy a share of an American company listed in the 
New York Stock Exchange. But the financial integration was not only prevalent among 
industrialized countries. Investing in emerging markets became popular in order to 
maximize gains and minimize risk through portfolio diversification. It all seemed to be 
going well with the birth of powerful emerging actors such as Thailand and Brazil, but 
most importantly, China.  
It was then that the world realized that financial systems integration also meant an 
increased risk of contagion. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that the effects of 
the Thai baht crisis were not limited to Thailand. Upon the collapse of the Thai economy 
in 1997, investors from all over the world fled both Asian markets and all emerging 
markets, intensifying the downfall of affected economies (Krugman, 2009). Facing high 
risk, investors restricted loans to emerging economies. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis 
became endemic and economies were highly set back in their growth.  
The contagion of the Thai baht crisis led to severe financial and banking crises in 
Latin America (Krugman, 2009). It led, for example, to the collapse of the Brazilian, 
Argentinean, Mexican, and Ecuadorean economies. With the collapse, these countries 
were left in a state of economic distress. This is why countries in emerging markets 
started thinking of new policies and interventions that fitted their particular needs.  
In Ecuador in particular, the banking sector had been deteriorating for the past 
twenty years (Jácome, 2003). The contagion effect pushed the banking sector into a full-
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fledged crisis. Before the year 2000, banks were overexposed and undercapitalized and 
could not meet their commitments. Inflation ran rampant and the government tried to 
alleviate the problem by printing even more money causing the sucre to depreciate. This 
development further undermined banks, as most of the loans made in the country were 
denominated in dollars. Several banks went under, including the largest one, Filanbanco. 
The government was forced to freeze the banks’ assets in order to prevent a run on the 
banks and a widespread contagion effect (Jácome, 2003). These conditions brought about 
the collapse of the sucre, which then forced Ecuador’s President, Jamil Mahuad, to adopt 
the dollar as legal tender.  
The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first goal is to explore how the stability 
of the Ecuadorean banking system has changed in the past decade, and to explain the 
causes of the change. Its second goal is to understand the effect of dollarization on the 
stability of the system. To answer these questions, I develop a model of banking stability 
that I estimate for the years 2000 to 2011. The econometric analysis shows that the 
banking system has in fact become more stable in the past decade and, coupled with a 
theoretical analysis, it shows that dollarization is the underlying reason for the improved 
financial stability in Ecuador. 
My research contributes to the literature by submitting a case-study that focuses 
on the stability of the banking system of Ecuador. It is exactly the type of analysis that 
economists suggest in order to properly understand policy implications of drastic 
measures, such as dollarization, to minimize the negative unexpected consequences of 
said interventions. Furthermore, it is an important first step to understand how 
dollarization affects the banking sector in particular. 
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 Chapter one is a brief overview of the literature on the main effects of 
dollarization and determinants of financial stability. While there is abundant literature on 
both topics, their relationship has been less analyzed. Most of the literature on 
dollarization was written at the beginning of the 21st century and there are not sufficient 
case studies of small, dollarized economies such as Ecuador. 
 Chapter two summarizes Ecuador’s economic history from its independence from 
Spain until the financial crisis of the late 1990s. It focuses on three economic periods, 
each defined by the main export commodity of the time: the cocoa bean from early 
republican times until the 1920s, followed by bananas (of which Ecuador is still the 
world’s largest exporter) until the late 1960s, and oil since the 1970s when it was first 
produced. In addition, I analyze the “lost decade” of the 1980s, and the turmoil of the 
1990s that led to the dollarization process in early 2000. 
 Chapter three presents the model that helps me develop my work. The model was 
proposed in a thesis written by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hernández (2009). Her model attempts 
to answer the question on whether more stability or more fragility is brought about by an 
increased concentration of the banking system in the Dominican Republic. Using this 
model as a starting point, I redefine a few relationships, definitions, and scope of the 
estimations, and I estimate the overall stability of the entire banking system in Ecuador. 
In contrast to Pérez Hernández’s model, I include aggregate data from all banks rather 
than focusing on selected banks. In addition, the definitions of certain variables were 
amended trying as best as possible not to alter their meaning. Also, in order to simplify 
the model, this study is a time-series analysis rather than a cross-sectional analysis of all 
banks operating in Ecuador’s financial system in the time period between 2000 and 2011. 
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 Chapter four presents the results and estimations of the model. It is important to 
note that the biggest hurdle in the construction of the model was the large serial 
autocorrelation of the dependent variables. To address this shortcoming, I used the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method of estimation to run the regressions. With this method, it is clear 
that the results are very significant and relevant for the Ecuadorean financial system.  
 In chapter five, I engage in a theoretical analysis of how dollarization affects both 
the system wide financial stability of Ecuador and the stability of the Ecuadorean market 
for credits. This establishes a theoretical connection between the dollarization process 
and the stability of the financial system. I had to do this because I could not find 
information of the period before dollarization in Ecuador. This meant that I was not able 
to conduct an empirical analysis on how dollarization has affected the financial system. I 
conclude the chapter with a brief discussion on what other variables, such as the oil price, 
may have affected the banking system in this particular period of time.  
I close my analysis with a short summary of findings, explain why they are 
relevant, and forward suggestions on how my analysis could be improved. I also discuss 
recommendations for Ecuador and other countries that might consider dollarization in the 
future. 
  
 8
Chapter 1- Review of the Literature 
 
 The topic of dollarization was popular at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s 
when several economists advocated that emerging countries should adopt a foreign 
currency in order to stabilize their economies. The main argument in favor of 
dollarization is the immediate price stability and trust in the economy that the adoption of 
the US dollar as legal tender will bring, particularly if  the value of the domestic currency 
is in jeopardy. 
In the article “Strict Dollarization and Economic Performance” Sebastian 
Edwards and I. Igal Magendzo note, “the probability of being a dollarized country 
depends on regional, geographical, political and structural variables” (Edwards & 
Magendzo, 2003). Kenneth P. Jameson in his article “Dollarization: Wave of the Future 
or Flight to the Past” further argues that dollarization, without being imposed by external 
actors, is likely to occur under three circumstances. First, dollars to the domestic 
economy must be available in large quantities. Second, domestic instability must affect 
the functioning of the financial system and the confidence of domestic actors. Third, 
there has to be an important dollarized sector of the economy (Jameson, 2001). 
In their article “Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking System,” 
Douglas Gale and Xavier Vives also suggest that, in order for dollarization to be 
beneficial for countries, it has to meet four main characteristics. First, the costs of 
liquidating projects for banks have to be relatively small. Second, the monitoring effort of 
bankers is important in improving the returns of the banks. Third, the costs of 
establishing a reputation for the Central Bank must be deemed high. And fourth, moral 
hazard cannot be too extreme in order for dollarization to be effective (Gale &Vives, 
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2002). Jameson further argues that dollarization is nearly irreversible and that four 
additional criteria need to be met for it to be beneficial. These criteria are: economies 
should be tightly integrated and should experience similar shocks; the adopting country is 
small, open, and its prices are largely set in dollars; the adopting market has flexible labor 
markets that can adjust to shocks; and finally the adopting country’s Central Bank has 
low credibility in undertaking stable policy. The author later analyzes the case study of 
Ecuador and claims that in this case dollarization was the only alternative (Jameson, 
2001).  
Douglas Gale and Xavier Vives also list a set of benefits and costs associated with 
dollarization. They claim that an economy benefits from dollarization because it “reduces 
the transaction costs of trade, and if the country adopts a stable currency it commits to a 
stable monetary policy.” The authors point out that dollarization “has the potential cost of 
abandoning monetary policy and the exchange rate as policy instruments and 
compromising the capacity to bail out the domestic banking system.” They claim this is 
dangerous because the banking crises can be very damaging as a bailout often costs up to 
20 percent of a country’s GDP (Gale & Vives, 2002).  
Sebastian Edwards disputes the idea proposed by many economists that 
dollarization is the best scenario for developing nations in his article “Dollarization and 
Economic Performance.” Like Gale and Vives, Edwards agrees that a more careful 
analysis is needed in order to decide whether a dollarization process is beneficial or 
detrimental for an economy. Edwards concludes that the dollarization by itself does not 
reduce risk; to be effective it has to be accompanied by other policies and/or events that 
increase the stability of the system. He also claims that because the exchange rate is 
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fixed, countries cannot adapt to external shocks, and that the Central Bank loses the 
ability to print money. This signifies the loss of seignorage - the profit Central Banks gain 
when printing money (Edwards, 2001). 
 Sofia Castillo (2006) disagrees with the abovementioned statements of Edwards 
and Magendzo. She claims that increased dollarization (financial) is positively associated 
with economic growth.  She also states that the process has a stronger impact on inflation 
than on any other variables. Furthermore, Castillo argues that dollarizing the economy 
helps attract foreign direct investment, lowers interest rates, and makes trade easier, 
especially for smaller countries in Latin America that trade predominantly with the 
United States (Castillo, 2006).  
Castillo also presents the view that dollarizing the economies is the only way to 
achieve economic stability in Latin America. According to her “multivariate econometric 
analysis,” dollarization has brought greater economic stability and economic progress to 
Latin America. She ends her analysis by listing the negative effects: the loss of monetary 
policy and the decline of the national identity represented by the national currency 
(Castillo, 2006). 
 Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco claim in their article “Dollarization: 
Analytical Issues” that the costs of dollarization are due both to the fixity of exchange 
rates and the loss of seignorage. The benefits are the amelioration of time-inconsistency 
problems and the increasing of credibility of regulatory institutions; meaning that trust 
and credibility are built on the Central Bank and other regulatory institutions. The 
implication, then, is that the loss of seignorage can only be “unambiguously interpreted 
as real losses to the economy if policy credibility problems are assumed away.” They 
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argue that currencies are national symbols that would be costly to get rid of due to the 
sense of pride that a country’s citizens invest in them (Chang &Velasco, 2001).  
Edwards and Magendzo summarize the debate and note that those in favor of 
dollarization claim that it will result in lower inflation, lower interest rates, higher 
investment, and faster growth. They note that those opposed to dollarization assert that it 
will result in difficulties accommodating external shocks including terms of trade and 
world interest rate disturbances. Finally, Edwards and Magendzo conclude that other 
economists simply state that the exchange rate does not affect growth but rather that 
growth is determined by other variables (Edwards & Magendzo, 2003). 
Perhaps one of the most disputed topics within the debate of dollarization is the 
effect of the loss of a Lender of Last Resort (LOLR). Gale and Vives discuss how bank 
bailouts might not always be beneficial and they provide the following four main reasons: 
1. The threat of bankruptcy and loss of private benefits can motivate managers to exert 
effort and improve the performance of the firm.  
2. The possibility of a bailout reduces this incentive effect and indirectly encourages 
managerial shirking and risk taking. 
3. In emerging markets, moral hazard problems are widespread, and the economy relies 
in an important way on the monitoring effort of bankers who provide finance to 
entrepreneurial projects.  
4. A time-consistent policy by the Central Bank may lead to excessive bailouts. 
Anticipating this lack of financial discipline, bankers will not make sufficient effort to 
screen and monitor projects. The result will be excessive financing of inferior projects, 
inadequate monitoring, and poor project performance. 
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Thus, dollarization represents a commitment by the Central Bank to a limited use 
of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) and of Central Bank independence. Furthermore, 
the perceptions of a market-default diminished when dollarization was implemented 
possibly indicating that “banks were market-disciplined and responded to increases in 
risk perception by being more prudent” (Gale & Vives, 2002).  
One of the main questions Barry Eichengreen poses in his paper “What Problems 
can Dollarization solve?” is whether dollarization is more likely to speed up or slow 
down economic and financial reform. He states that there are two versions to the 
argument. The first one says that dollarization will compel bank owner-managers to 
acknowledge that they are no longer protected by the financial safety net. The other 
argument is that dollarization enhances financial stability by promoting the development 
of domestic financial markets. This enhancement is mainly achieved through the 
disappearance of currency risk associated with smaller, more volatile currencies 
(Eichengreen, 2001). 
In addition to the theory mentioned above, economists have conducted empirical 
analyses and shown differing results. Gale and Vives end their analysis with a set of 
empirical results for countries that have adopted the dollar (or other important currencies) 
as their legal tender. Regarding Ecuador in particular, they claim that dollarization could 
be advantageous, as it fits the characteristics mentioned above. They do note, however, 
that their article should only be used as a starting point for policy implementation and 
that a more thorough analysis of individual case studies is needed to make a final 
decision (Gale &Vives, 2002). 
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Edwards also conducts an empirical analysis of whether dollarization has helped 
countries that have adopted it. He states that “when compared to other countries, the 
dollarized nations have had a significantly lower inflation” as well as a “significantly 
lower growth rate of GDP per capita.” He states that these countries have had a similar 
fiscal record, have not been spared from major current account reversals, and that the 
costs of external shocks are higher in terms of investment and growth (Edwards, 2001).  
A critical aspect to consider is Edwards’s and Magendzo’s finding that “GDP per 
capita growth has not been statistically different in dollarized and in non-dollarized ones 
but volatility has been significantly higher in dollarized than in non-dollarized 
economies.” They also reiterate the idea presented in the other articles that inflation is 
significantly lower in dollarized countries (Edwards & Magendzo, 2003). 
 In terms of financial stability, Luisa Erika Pérez Hernández (2009) presents an 
analysis of two models that are intended to measure the stability of the banking system of 
the Dominican Republic. She specifies two dependent variables; one refers to the system 
wide stability, and the other to credit risk. Both models have the same seven independent 
variables.  It is important to note, however, that the main purpose of her analysis is to 
show the relationship between concentration and stability of the banking system as well 
as the shape of this relationship (Pérez Hernández, 2009). 
 To summarize, economists agree that dollarization brings about lower rates of 
inflation and an increase in stability of the country. They also agree that the credibility of 
regulatory institutions is enhanced and that the currency risk disappears along with the 
currency itself. They also agree that with the loss of monetary policy and the national 
currency countries lose a measure of sovereignty that might affect the country both 
 14
economically and politically. The matter is not so clear in terms of macroeconomic 
growth. Economists disagree on whether more growth is achieved or if there is no 
difference. They also disagree on how growth volatility is affected. Surprisingly, there is 
no focus on specific sectors of the economies that might help answer some of these 
questions.    
My present paper adds to the literature an important case-specific econometric 
analysis that explains the banking stability of Ecuador. I link the stability of the banking 
system to dollarization both directly and indirectly, in order to understand how 
dollarization has affected the evolution of banking. My hypothesis is that gains in greater 
strength and efficiency of the banking sector- in any country that dollarizes- may more 
than outweigh the costs of seignorage loss and limited opportunity for LOLR by the 
Central Bank. 
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Chapter 2: Economic History of Ecuador 
 
 The economic history of Ecuador between the 19th and the late 20th centuries is 
not a happy one. It is marked by short periods of bonanza based on the exports of a single 
commodity, followed by a large and detrimental crisis with the deterioration of the terms 
of trade and loss of market share. This cycle between economic prosperity and crisis has 
led to widespread political instability and political tensions between the two most 
powerful economic regions within the country, coupled with growth volatility.  
 There are three major economic periods in the history of Ecuador: the cocoa 
period, when Ecuador clearly distinguished itself as the main producer and exporter of 
the good for international markets; the export of bananas and Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) policies; and the extraction and sale of crude oil since the early 
1970s .  Each period is followed by long crises defined by the fall in price of the product, 
the increase in competition, and vulnerability to the competition and volatility of 
international markets. In the following sections, I analyze each of these periods in 
addition to the effects said period had on the politics and distribution of power within the 
country. Next, I address the lost decade and the crisis of the late 1990s, since these were 
of particular significance for the dollarization process and the evolution of the banking 
system in the country. 
The Cocoa Period: Beginning of the Natural Resource Curse in Ecuador 
 
 After achieving political independence, Ecuador’s economy was based primarily 
on agriculture. Most of the economic activities performed in the country were grounded 
in the “hacienda” system of exploitation, where the land was distributed in large 
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latifundia among the elites. Paul Henderson quotes Ivar Erneholm, author of the book 
Cocoa production of South America when he notes that, “seldom has a single product for 
such a long time dominated the economic life of a country as did cocoa in Ecuador” 
(Henderson, 1997). Production of cocoa in the coast started in the 1830s, and 
immediately became the major source of income for the country. Because of its regional 
production, it set the economic regional elites of the coast against the political and 
economic elites of the highlands. During the late 19th century and beginning of the 20th 
century, the market for the good was flooded with a large increase in competition from 
other regions of the world. This international development plunged Ecuador into an 
economic crisis and recession that lasted until the onset of the Great Depression in the 
United States. 
The Cocoa Bonanza  
 During the mid 19th century, Ecuador was able to establish itself as the major 
producer of cocoa in the world, which allowed for a period of economic growth and 
prosperity. Indeed, international observers were optimistic about Ecuador's future 
performance due to its large market share of this product (Henderson, 1997).  
 The cocoa trade expansion ensued during the decades between 1870 and 1910. In 
England, demand and consumption of cocoa increased eightfold despite the rise in prices, 
as the then new beverage, hot chocolate, became very popular (Henderson, pg. 171). 
Exports of cocoa rose from 8,380 kilos in 1860 to 18,120 kilos in 1880 and 36,305 kilos 
in 1910. In this period, the production expansion was attributed not only to land 
redistribution and more effective agricultural practices, but also to the claiming of 
previously unused territories in the Ecuadorean lowlands by large families. In fact, 
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around 70 percent of the cocoa producing land in the coast belonged to between 10 and 
20 families (Henderson, pg. 174). 
 Labor force exploitation was also predominant during this period. Most of the 
labor employed both in the production of cocoa beans in the coast and other agricultural 
products in the north, was based on a semi-servile system and semi-waged labor force. In 
exchange for small parcels of land, workers were required to work for the large estate 
holders. They were not paid salaries and had no benefits. Furthermore, workers were tied 
to the lands they worked on by a system referred to in Ecuador as “concertaje.” With this 
system, inherited from colonial times, the landowner elites granted loans to their serfs 
that were very difficult (if not impossible) to repay.  Debt repayment forced workers and 
their families to be tied down to the estate, because if the original debtor could not pay, 
their children and family members inherited the land, along with their obligations. The 
one big change that occurred during the cocoa economy was the introduction of seasonal 
waged labor. During harvesting times, some workers were given wages in order to supply 
all the labor required to gather the crops. This, however, was an insignificant percentage 
of the labor force, as the labor environment remained mainly an adaptation to the feudal 
system seen in the centuries before.   
 
The Decline in the Cocoa Trade and the Collapse of the Economy 
 
 Up until the 1920s, cocoa exports represented a large amount of the Ecuadorean 
GDP, and then the economy began to suffer. As all single-export commodity oriented 
economies, Ecuador was hit by a crisis in its cocoa industry. Several factors contributed 
to its decline: exogenous factors such as the increase in international competition, internal 
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collapse of the political system, and irresponsible use of the revenues by the controlling 
elites.  
 During the early 20th century, Ecuador’s cocoa trade took a turn for the worse. 
With increased competition coming from African countries and Brazil, Ecuador saw a 
large decrease in its market share for cocoa production. This development was later 
accentuated by the fall of demand due to the Great Depression. Before 1910, exports of 
cocoa from Ecuador accounted for well over 20 percent of world production. In 1914, 
even though Ecuador saw a particularly high harvest, its market share accounted for only 
15.3 percent of world production (Henderson, 1997). Large plagues hit the Ecuadorean 
crops during the post WWI period. The diseases Witches' Broom and Monilia Pot Rod 
largely decimated crops in Ecuador and created large losses for the exporting elites 
(Henderson, 1997). World over-production of cocoa drove the price down which 
accounted for large losses for the economy.  
 Use of cocoa revenue by the elite was a major factor in the failure of the exporting 
cocoa boom because they failed to reinvest it in the local economy and squandered it 
abroad instead. During the boom, several of the most prominent exporter families chose 
to reside outside of Ecuador, predominantly in Paris. This practice was so prevalent that, 
between 1900-1913, almost 20 percent of export income was transferred to family 
members who lived abroad (Larrea and North, 1997).  The economic elites did not invest 
in Ecuador; rather, they preferred to buy imported non-essential goods. This large 
increase in imports destroyed national enterprises, which led to a failure of the economy 
to diversify and accentuated the dependence on cocoa for its survival.  
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 The fall in the cocoa economy left a large vacuum in Ecuador and the economy 
did not recover until the 1940's when the increase in banana production replaced that of 
the cocoa bean. During the time of the cocoa trade, the economy clearly did not diversify 
and relied on a single crop that was easy to produce and transport with little backward 
and forward linkages. Even though cocoa production lost all of its significance and the 
bankruptcy of several of the largest producers led to the abandonment of large estates, the 
economic core of this elite survived to recover its economic power. The old elite, along 
with some new members, started the production of bananas after World War II (WWII).   
Ecuador after World War II: The Banana Republic 
 
 Even today, Ecuador is known as a predominant example of a banana republic. 
The country is still the largest exporter of bananas in the world and despite its diminished 
importance, bananas still constitutes the largest agricultural export of Ecuador. In 1948, 
after World War II, the economic elite of the coast reengaged in significant banana 
production. Cooperation between multinational corporations and the Ecuadorean 
government created a partnership for a new stage of economic growth. The economy 
finally showed some signs of economic and structural reform, both in the export and 
internal sectors of production. Unlike cocoa, banana production revolutionized how the 
economy functioned because large revenues allowed the country to implement ISI. The 
banana boom only lost its momentum with the emergence of the oil sector in the early 
70s.   
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The Banana Boom 
  
After two decades of economic stagnation, the Ecuadorean economy finally 
showed some signs of recovery in the 1950’s due to the export of bananas. This 
commodity was vastly different from cocoa and allowed diversification and 
industrialization. Banana production replaced the old system of haciendas with a system 
of plantations, and most of the production came from small to mid-sized plantations that 
were primarily nationally owned.  
 The banana production industry differs from the cocoa industry because it is labor 
intensive and works mostly with paid workers. Rafael Correa, an economist and current 
constitutional President of Ecuador, claims that this was one of the main milestones 
achieved by the banana bonanza (SOURCE?). Prior to it, the wage-labor in the country 
was negligible. In the period after WWII, a massive migratory movement from the 
Ecuadorean highlands, where the system of “concertaje” was in place, to the coastlands 
took place. Here, the demand for labor was immense and owners used wages as an 
incentive for workers. This migratory movement also reflected the high unemployment in 
the aftermath of the fall of the cocoa trade and the opportunities that banana production 
offered. The government, whose interests lay with the large producers of bananas, backed 
the shift in employer-worker relations. It promoted large programs of development of 
previously unoccupied and therefore unproductive territories. This meant that the banana 
sector encouraged the appearance of a sizable rural middle class in parts of the export 
zone (Correa, 2008). 
 The result of this shift was not only a more mobile labor class, but also large 
degrees of urbanization. With the elimination of the hacienda system through a reform, 
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the labor force that was once tied down to large estates could now move freely. This 
meant that a large amount of previously unemployed or underemployed individuals 
moved to large cities, mainly Quito and Guayaquil.  
 Another important shift in Ecuador’s economy during the banana period was that 
banana production, as opposed to cocoa production, required large amounts of 
investments in infrastructure, telecommunications, and commercialization. The 
government owned stakes in the production of bananas and facilitated trade with other 
countries. The boom, therefore, allowed Ecuador to engage in several industries that were 
previously neglected. Larrea and North (1997) claim that tax revenue derived from the 
substantially increased import capacity generated by the new export boom facilitated 
modernization of public institutions as well as the expansion of public investment not 
only in infrastructure but also in promotional activities (Larrea and North, 1997).  
 The government of Ecuador decided to follow the current economic trend in Latin 
America and began to implement ISI. The economic surplus created by the banana trade 
provided the economy with the first opportunity to engage in such policies. While the 
extent to which the policies implemented can truly be defined as ISI is debated, it is clear 
that the government incentivized local production in order to encourage industrialization. 
International institutions such as the United Nations directly supported ISI. In fact, in 
1954 Raúl Prebisch addressed the organism and presented his report entitled “The 
Economic Development of Ecuador” in which he emphasized the importance and 
urgency of implementation of ISI policies in the country (Correa, 2008). That same year 
in May, the “Junta de Planificación” was created. This organism had the mandate to 
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foment ISI. The ISI model of economic development, however, had its main impacts in 
the following decade during the oil boom. 
The Decline of the Banana Trade  
  
Even though Ecuador is still the largest banana exporter in the world, the staple 
has lost relative importance in the local market for several reasons. First, the discovery of 
oil in the mid 1960s, and its production starting in 1972, led the commodity to become 
second in importance to government and international investors. Also, important 
technological advances in the 1960s had detrimental effects on the banana production 
labor force. In fact, in one coastal province alone, the labor force decreased from 90,000 
to 55,000 workers from 1965 to 1976 and to 36,500 workers in 1983. This led to higher 
unemployment, urbanization, and growth of the informal sector as the large amount of 
unemployed workers moved to large urban centers.  
 Wages decreased as unemployment was rampant. Economies of scale of new 
technological processes meant that the banana plantations would only achieve this 
efficiency with large plantations similar to those seen in the cocoa boom. In fact, there 
was a large drive both from multinational corporations operating in Ecuador and the 
government itself to centralize the production of bananas in a small number of firms in 
order to increase productivity. Thus as the 1960s and 1970s unfolded, banana production 
was centralized into four larger producers (one owned by the state and the other three by 
foreign investors).  This meant that previously large number of small to midsized firms 
lost considerable market share and these firms were driven out of business, so banana 
production ceased to play a central role before the 1970s. 
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The Oil Boom: Ecuador's Future Redefined 
 
 During the mid-1960s, large oil fields were discovered beneath the Amazon rain 
forest. This represented the single most important discovery in Ecuadorean economic 
history and it shaped how Ecuador approached the world. It redefined Ecuador from an 
agricultural exporter of bananas into an economy focused largely on crude oil extraction. 
In fact, Ecuador became a member of the Organization of Oil Producing Countries 
(OPEC). The economic model for Ecuador, however, remained one based on the export 
of one primary commodity, though revenues from oil led Ecuador into a period of 
unprecedented growth, industrialization, and development. 
The Oil Boom 
  
During the 1960s, when banana exports were significantly changing with the 
increase of technology and formation of large estates, the oil discovery marked the 
beginning of a new economic period. ISI policies that started during the banana boom 
were further accentuated with the massive inflows of petrodollars to the economy. The 
large oil sector expansion allowed for massive amounts of foreign direct investments 
(FDI) as well as large loans to the government.  
 One of the most notable effects of the sudden oil extraction surge was the 
substantial increase in living standards. “Ecuador grew 14 percent in 1972, 25 percent in 
1973, and 8 percent on average between 1971 through 1981 which meant that GDP more 
than duplicated in these ten years” (Correa, 2008). This unprecedented expansion led to 
large increases in population, urbanization, and population wellbeing. GDP per capita 
grew by 72 percent due to the oil boom during this period (Correa, 2008). Illiteracy fell 
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from 23.7 percent of the population in 1974 to 14.8 percent in 1982 (North and Larrea, 
1997). In terms of urbanization, Correa states “in 1965, 65 percent of the labor force was 
rural whereas in 1982 this number dropped to 48 percent. This means that urban labor 
force grew by 137 percent in 20 years” (Correa, 2008). All these indicators show that the 
Ecuadorean society was revolutionized with the exports of oil. 
 ISI measures first implemented during the banana era were expanded. Correa 
(2008) states that industrial exports grew 28 percent per year in the 1970s due to 
economic reforms going from 29 to 490 million dollars. This large industrialization push 
was managed not only through the promotion of national industries but also through a 
large increase in the net amount of industrial imports. Imports increased from 181 to 
1.318 billion dollars during this period. Thus, despite significant growth of industrial 
exports, industrial imports increased almost tenfold causing a large non-oil current 
account deficit accentuating the reliance on revenue gained from oil in order to maintain 
a stable government balance (Henderson, 1997)  
The Impacts of the Oil Boom 
  
As mentioned above, the reliance on oil for growth meant that the amount of 
imports dramatically increased. As the economy became increasingly reliant on 
international markets for oil, it also needed the high crude oil prices brought about by the 
oil shocks. The large amount of capital required for oil extraction led the government to 
engage in heavy borrowing, which later led to the debt crisis of 1983. Also, the large 
levels of urbanization promoted by the oil boom meant that there were not enough 
workers in the agricultural areas of the country and too many unemployed workers 
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settling in the city, which was detrimental for both urban and rural societies alike. Lastly, 
Ecuador is a clear example of the Dutch disease in action. When the price of oil fell, the 
fundamental weaknesses of the country’s economy were evident. 
Policies intended to promote ISI were also unable to create their expected 
economic growth due to the large amount of imports promoted by the large revenues of 
oil exports. It is ironic that during a period that was supposedly dedicated to the 
promotion of national production and industrial development, industrial imports 
increased more than sevenfold (Correa, 2008). This caused a complete lack of vertical 
integration between the different companies of the country. Production of one good was 
still dependent on the exchange rate, as the raw materials needed to expand, or even 
continue production, were imported and thus, the country’s industrial production varied 
when the exchange rate varied. This is why economists that focus on Ecuador claim that 
ISI was not viable. 
 
The Lost Decade of Latin America: The Tragic Example of Ecuador  
 
 When Mexico defaulted on its loans in 1982, most Latin American countries 
found themselves facing a precarious future. In Ecuador, the government’s capacity to 
borrow from international capital markets diminished, the internal banking system was 
highly indebted and about to collapse, and a number of external factors were affecting the 
country’s exports. These developments led to large social and political unrest, as well as 
an economic recession.  
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The Ecuadorean Debt 
 
A variety of factors affected the government’s capacity to borrow during the 
1970s and the 1980s. First, there was a large increase in liquidity in international markets, 
which led international banks and creditors to consider developing regions as potential 
markets for their investments and loans. Interest rates charged to developing countries 
were low, which lowered the cost of borrowing money. In theory, international banks 
wanted to maximize their returns through investing in high yield development programs 
in Latin America. They also had to find a market for their extra cash in order  to offer the 
returns they promised their clients. In Ecuador, this meant that loans owned by 
international banks and financial institutions grew from 82 billion dollars to 440 billion 
dollars.  
 The largest growth period in public debt in Ecuador started in 1976.  Public debt 
went from 229 million dollars in 1970 to 4.416 billion dollars in 1981. This change 
translated into a very large increase in government spending. In fact, Correa calculates 
that public spending grew threefold during this period (Correa, 2008). As a percentage of 
GDP, this change translated into an increase from 12 to 16 percent of GDP, causing 
private investments to drop to only 6 percent of GDP. Due to the large availability of 
funds, most of the loans were contracted at flexible interest rates within the range of 4 to 
6 percent, but were subject to revision. Thus, when the Mexican government defaulted on 
their loans and banks lost confidence in emerging markets, loan interest rates contracted 
by Ecuador went up to 20 percent. These loans were virtually impossible to pay. The 
government used the price of oil as backup in order to contract more loans. During the 
1970s, the nominal price of oil reached levels above the US $40 per barrel mark. After 
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the oil booms and with the reentry of countries that had not been producing during the 
last decade into the market, the price collapsed to below US $15 per barrel in 1983. With 
the increase in the interest rates and the decrease of revenues of oil (which accounted for 
at least 50 percent of GDP at the time) Ecuador found itself in a highly detrimental debt 
trap (Correa, 2008).  
 Most of the Ecuadorean debt contracted from 1976 onwards was public, but the 
private sector also assumed large debts. Since the year 1976, private debt went from 57 
million dollars to 1.452 billion dollars in 1981. The government sponsored substantial 
portions of this massive increase in debt in order to implement ISI. When the oil price 
fell, the Ecuadorean government was no longer able to maintain the exchange rate that it 
had previously stabilized after the rise in oil price. When this change ensued, the 
exchange rate grew from 25 sucres to US$1 in 1979 to 42 sucres to US$1 in 1983, almost 
doubling the amount national private debtors had to pay: debts had been contracted in 
dollars but firms earned in sucres. The exchange rate entered a downward spiral and, by 
the beginning of the 1990's, it stood at 800 sucres per US$1. This measurable drop drove 
the government to take extreme and, perhaps, mistaken policies that would generate 
further indebtedness of the public sector (Correa, 2008).  
Ecuador through the “Lost Decade” 
  
After the collapse generated by the debt crisis in 1983, Ecuador faced a period of 
stagnation and economic hardship. During the 1980s Ecuador saw its economy shrink, its 
political institutions weaken, and its banking sector in need of a bailout.  To make matters 
worse, the winter of 1983 disrupted exports of agricultural products from the coast 
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(bananas, shrimp, etc.), and the earthquake in 1987 broke the pipeline through which 
most of the oil extracted from the Amazon was transported to the coast to be shipped.  
Both disasters caused huge losses in the country’s export capacity.  
 The debt crisis’ most critical effect was on the country’s standard of living. 
Between 1981-1990, the GDP grew only 18 percent, so GDP per capita decreased by 
5.67 percent annually back to mid-1970's levels (Correa 2008). The 1990 minimum wage 
was only 41 percent of that in 1981. The industrial sector was also affected; during this 
decade, industrial GDP decreased by 3.78 percent and industrial exports were lower in 
1990 than in 1978 (Correa, 2008).  
 As the sucre depreciated and interest rates on loans contracted, the oil boom 
continued, while the debt held by private institutions (mainly banks) reached such high 
levels that it threatened the entire financial system. The government of Osvaldo Hurtado 
adopted what it became known as the Sucretización of private external debt. The 
government assumed responsibility for the dollar debts of the private sector, which 
amounted to 1.476 billion dollars, and allowed the private institutions to pay the 
government back in sucres. This move helped banks and financial companies, for it 
prevented the continuing depreciation of the exchange rate to increase their private debt. 
In addition, the government froze what interest rates companies had to pay at 16 percent 
when the international interest rates surpassed 28 percent, and extended the period 
companies had to pay their loans from three years to seven years. External debt increased 
from around $4 billion in 1981 to upwards of $12 billion by 1990 due to refinancing and 
capitalization of interests that were late. These measures helped limit the extent to which 
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investments fell, which ultimately proved to be only 14 percent of GDP, of which only 3 
percent was public investment (Correa, 2008). 
The Decade of 1990 and the Financial Crisis 
  
After the disappointment and hardships of the lost decade, world-renowned 
economists backed by the IMF and the World Bank suggested a set of policies of 
economic liberalization, commonly referred to as the Washington Consensus. Once 
again, Ecuador was fully committed to implement the reforms and liberalized its 
economy extensively during the presidency of Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996). Durán 
Ballén restructured the state-owned oil producing companies, granted more independence 
to the Central Bank, forbade the funding of financial expenditure with its funds, 
privatized the previously state-owned electric and telecommunications industries, and 
deregulated the banking and financial systems (Jácome, 2004).  
 As in earlier periods, external factors affected extensively Ecuador’s 
development. In 1995, Ecuador engaged in a military conflict with neighboring Peru. Due 
to fear of inflationary and contractionary forces, the clash incited the fleeing from the 
country of large amounts of capital. As if to make matters worse, El Niño, a 
meteorological phenomenon, hit Ecuador in early 1990s, impacting greatly agricultural 
productivity and the price of oil per barrel. The dual downturn engendered a large 
reduction of export revenues. Lastly, the Asian financial crisis, which started in 1997, 
brought about renewed investor uncertainty with regards to emerging markets. All of this 
combined led to a period of instability in the financial sector (Jácome, 2004). 
 30
 The deregulation of the banking and financial system designed to address the 
crisis created internal problems in the banks. It brought about the deterioration of balance 
sheets, a lack of reserves and therefore liquidity, and the default of risky and bad credits. 
In order to avoid the collapse of these private institutions, the Central Bank, in 
conjunction with the government, created an agency for the guarantee of deposits (AGD). 
With AGD in place, 100 percent of deposits were held in banks with no limit in the 
nominal value, as it is customarily done in most countries (Correa, 2008). And yet, a 
measure that was intended to stabilize the financial system led to renewed problems of 
moral hazard and an increase in the approval of risky loans. With the government serving 
as the ultimate guarantor responsible for all deposits made to the banking system, 
whenever a debtor defaulted on its loans, the government would reimburse the bank for 
its original investments in the form of client deposits (Jácome, 2004).  
 The only way the government could control the financial crisis was through the 
use of monetary policy, which it used in a very irresponsible manner. It printed large 
amounts of sucres in order to counter the lack of liquidity faced by banks. In 1998, the 
monetary base increased by 41 percent and 136 percent during the following year. This 
measure led to high levels of inflation, which in turn affected the exchange rate. The 
average Consumer Price Index went from 23 percent in 1995 to 52 percent in 1999 and 
96 percent in 2000 (Jácome, 2004). These increases, combined with negative 
expectations of investors and the newly adopted floating exchange rate regime (as the 
crawling peg could no longer be sustained), led to a large and rapid depreciation of the 
exchange rate. It went from 800 sucres per dollar in 1990 to around 2,565 sucres per 
dollar in 1995, and to a shocking 11,787 sucres per dollar in 1999. From then to the 
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moment dollarization was put in place in January 2000, the price of the US dollar in 
terms of sucres soared up to 25,000 sucres per dollar, at which the country's government 
set a cap and adopted the dollar as the legal tender in Ecuador (Jácome, 2004).  
 Another factor that made the crisis even worse was the application of a tax of 1 
percent to all capital movements, no matter their size. This action was combined with an 
income tax elimination, which was said to put a burden on people that could not afford 
payment. As a result, people withdrew as much cash as they could in order to use it and 
not be taxed. The resulting run on the banks had large inflationary consequences on 
everybody throughout Ecuador. This tax had to be revoked in 2000, when those in power 
realized that it was unsustainable and detrimental for the economy Furthermore, to 
prevent the collapse of banks, the government froze assets held as deposits by their 
customers. This action brought renewed social unrest from people demanding access to 
their funds. The government froze the assets when the exchange rate was 10,350 sucres 
per dollar, and unfroze them after dollarization was introduced, when the exchange rate 
had gone up to 25,000 sucres per dollar. 
 In short, the social costs of the crisis were immense. Population living under the 
poverty line increased from 4.2 to 5.54 million people between 1995 and 1999 and the 
GDP per capita fell by 7.6 percent in one year.  Income inequality also increased- during 
the early 1990's the lowest quintile got 4.4 percent of income and upper quintile got 52 
percent, whereas in 2004 the percentages were 2.7 percent and 60 percent respectively. 
Lastly, a massive surge of migration ensued.  It is estimated (though the exact number is 
difficult to know due to illegal migration) that between 300,000 and 1 million people 
emigrated from Ecuador after the crisis.  
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 Though economists still disagree on the quality of the policies adopted by the 
government during the crisis, the consensus among neoliberal economists seems to be 
that the adoption of the US dollar as legal tender was the only solution. They saw it as the 
better of two evils: default of the banks and collapse of the system or an attempt to 
stabilize the economy without completely destroying the wealth held in banks. It was 
unclear, however, if the Ecuadorean economy was ready for such a move and its effects 
on the banking sector.   
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Chapter 3- The Models 
 
In this chapter, I present the banking stability models that will be estimated in 
chapter 4. These models are based on those presented by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hérnandez 
and are intended to measure the stability of the financial system as a whole, and the 
stability of the market for credits in particular.  
The aim of the model presented by Luisa Ericka Pérez Hernández (2009) is to 
measure the level of competition in the Dominican financial system, and to determine: a) 
if the level of competition of the financial system is positively correlated with its 
stability; and b) if this correlation is linear or if it is “U” shaped (parabolic). The core 
intent of her thesis is to use the Panzar and Rose H-statistic in order to determine the 
relationship between competition and the stability of the financial system. Panzar and 
Rose define their statistic as the sum of the elasticities of total income in respect to the 
cost of inputs (Pérez Hernández, 2009) and they use it to calculate the shape of the 
relationship between the competition and the stability of the financial system. 
Understanding the shape of the relationship has important policy implications. If it is 
determined that the shape of the relationship is parabolic, then there is an optimum level 
of concentration and competition at which the financial system would operate best. If the 
relationship is linear, one of the extremes will be the optimum depending on the sign of 
the correlation. 
 Pérez Hernández uses cross-sectional data and analyzes all the banks in the 
financial system of the Dominican Republic. Her model uses two different dependent 
variables to measure stability: The Z index and the NPL variable. The Z index measures 
the probability that the losses of each bank exceed the amount of productive assets.  The 
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NPL index is a measure of risk focused on the loan quality each bank holds in its 
portfolio (defined as the irrecoverable losses plus loans considered risky over the total 
amount of loans at period t). Each one of these dependent variables is explained in the 
following section. 
The independent variables for both models are the same: Ht that measures the 
level of concentration of the banking system; GDPt measures the rate of growth of GDP 
at time t; and CAit, LCit, CIRit, CVCit,EOit are all financial control indicators that measure 
the ratio of productive assets, liquidity, market share in terms of loans, ratio of loans on 
default, and financial efficiency, respectively. Thus, the two theoretical models the author 
estimates are the following: 
1. Z  βZ  φ H   φH  θGDP  γCIR  γCA  γLC 
γCVC  γEO  µ  ε And,  
2. NPL  βNPL  φ H  φH  θGDP  γCIR  γCA  γLC 
γCVC  γEO  µ  ε 
Banking Stability Models  
 
For this analysis, I modified Pérez Hernández’s (2009) model in the following 
way. First, I transformed the H-statistic and use it as an independent variable to measure 
the level of concentration of the banking system in Ecuador. Second, I slightly changed 
the mathematical definition of the variables due to data constraints. Furthermore, I have 
simplified aspects of Hernández’s analysis because I do not take into consideration the 
data of individual banks. Instead, I focus the analysis on the system-wide, aggregate data, 
which leads to important transformations.  
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Also, because I rely on time-series analysis, I cannot have too many dependent 
variables in each regression. If I were to include too many variables, I run the risk of 
trivializing the results and misconstruing the model. Thus, for each of the two models 
(both for Zt and for NPLt) I have selected variables that best provide a theoretical 
explanation of the variation. I use some of the variables in both models and some in only 
one of them.  
The information for the time period before July 2002 and the period afterwards 
are presented by the “Superintendencia de Bancos” in two distinct ways. Before July 
2002, the observations were much higher than the observations thereafter. There are two 
plausible explanations for this occurrence. First, there was some sort of structural change 
in either the economy or the financial system itself that brought about a change in the 
economy. An example of this possible change would be a cleansing of portfolios from 
loans on default aided by an increase in capital from the government in order to stabilize 
the banking industry and bring security into each bank. A second explanation is that the 
entity in charge of collecting the information for each bank (the “Superintendencia de 
Bancos”) changed their methodologies to calculate data after July 2002.  
Variable Specification 
 
In this section I discuss the two main dependent variables. Though I intend to 
explain what each dependent variable measures and how it does so, I also present a 
graphical representation of the observations as well as the mathematical formula for each. 
My analysis is accompanied by a short discussion on some of the problems encountered 
 when attempting to define the variables
define the independent variables 
Zt: Overall banking risk and the potential for financial collapse
 
The first dependent variable as explained by the original model is the probability 
that the losses of each particular bank
this analysis, the variable attempts to measu
failure. It is defined as the total nominal value of productive assets (TPA
nominal value of unproductive assets (TIA
in the system. The equation then, is
The intent of this variable is to measure the stability of the banking system since the year 
2000. The higher the proportion, the mor
assets rendering income for the banks
 
. After discussing the two dependent va
and what they measure. 
 
 exceed the return on assets for each institution. For 
re the probability of system-wid
t) minus the total 
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 NPLt: Credit risk and the stability of the credit market
 
The second dependent variable in the 
each bank. Pérez Hernández (2009) defines NPL as “risky loans
defines it as the nominal value of short
loans over the nominal value of total 
loans in Ecuador are mostly s
The value of past-due loans has decreased significantly and thus it is clear that the 
country’s credit risk has decreased
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original model measures the credit risk for 
.” More specifically
-term loans plus the nominal value of past
loans. In this analysis, this variable is misleading
hort-term (that “roll-over) and their value has increased. 
, which is why I define NPLt as the nominal amount of 
, since the risk of default is lower. 
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Independent Variables 
 
There are seven independent variables in the models introduced in this analysis. 
Below I present a brief description of each variable, including how it is defined, what it 
attempts to explain, as well as a graphical representation of the observations throughout 
the period of analysis. 
GDPt-1 
 
The first independent variable is GDPt-1. I used the natural log of the real value in 
order to make the coefficient more manageable. I also adjusted the data from quarterly to 
monthly in order to have the same number of observations as in all other variables. 
Furthermore, I lagged the data one month since, theoretically, the stability of the financial 
system is as likely to be affected by current and lagged GDP. If only current values were 
used, there is the statistical risk of mutual causation between the dependent and the 
independent variables. To avoid this problem I lagged GDP; in this way, GDP of the 
month prior to the one being analyzed cannot depend on the stability of the financial 
system and thus, the causation can only be in one direction. 
Lt: Liquidity 
 
This variable is defined as the available funds at time t divided by the short-term 
deposits held by the bank. I did not change this variable, but I took into account the 
information for the whole system. 
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Figure 3: Liquidity 
 
Ht: Degree of concentration of the financial system 
 
In the original model, this index variable measured the market power of each bank 
in the credit market of the Dominican Republic to capture the degree of concentration of 
the financial system. In this analysis I did not consider the data of individual banks, and 
thus I had to adapt the variable. To do so, I considered the aggregated values of the assets 
of the four largest banks in the system. Ideally, the variable would be defined as the 
income sum from the four largest banks over the total income of the system, but that 
information was not available for the period of analysis. Thus, I defined the variable as 
the sum of the total assets of the country’s four largest banks over the total value of assets 
of the system. The formula is: 
 ! 
∑ #$%%!
#$!
 
where TABBt stands for the Total Assets of Big Banks and TAt stands for total assets in 
the system. My objective was to capture the degree of concentration in the Ecuadorean 
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 financial system by measuring the percentage of assets that are held by those institutions 
that have the most assets in their balance sheets. 
Figure 
 
 It should be noted that
misinterpretation. In order to understand the significance of 
is necessary to understand the regulations of the 
the impact of the degree of concentration at a
have a strong presence in one region but not in another. Thus, it is important to keep the 
level of analysis at which the study
understand the variable’s on 
about the effect of the concentration of the financial system at a national level should not 
be extrapolated from this study,
nature of the data being considered.
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4: Assets of the 4 largest banks 
 a first look at the variable Ht could lead to a 
the sign of the coefficient
financial system. It is hard to understand 
 more regional level because 
 is being conducted clearly defined
the financial system’s stability. In other words, conclusions 
 especially because of the aggregate and macro
 
M
a
rc
h
A
u
g
u
st
Ja
n
u
a
ry
Ju
n
e
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
A
p
ri
l
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
F
e
b
ru
a
ry
Ju
ly
D
e
ce
m
b
e
r
M
a
y
O
ct
o
b
e
r
M
a
rc
h
A
u
g
u
st
Ja
n
u
a
ry
Ju
n
e
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Ht
40
 
, it 
a bank may 
 in order to 
economic 
N
o
v
e
m
b
e
r
A
p
ri
l
S
e
p
te
m
b
e
r
F
e
b
ru
a
ry
2010 2011
 41
CIRt: The balance sheet of the banks 
 
Since my data are defined at the macro-level, it is hard to have a variable that 
measures the market share of each bank in terms of loans. Instead, the variable measures 
the structure and stability of the banks’ balance sheets. CIRt is the total nominal value of 
assets in the system (TAt) over the total nominal value of the liabilities in the system 
(TLt). The formula for this ratio is: 
&'(! 
#$!
#)!
 
This variable seeks to capture two issues: a) to assess the level of soundness in the 
banking practice of the financial system in Ecuador. One of the basic accounting 
principles is that total assets are equal to total liabilities plus patrimony and, as such, the 
ratio should always be higher than one. Thus, a ratio in which total assets are higher than 
total liabilities shows promise of growth and expansion of the financial system. And b) 
too high a ratio shows that the system might be gravitating towards more risk of both 
systemic collapse due to a run on the banks and illiquidity to pay what it owes the people. 
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Figure 5: assets over liabilities 
  
A value much greater than 1 could mean irresponsible behavior because banks 
could be lending excessively and carelessly. Likewise, a ratio far below 1 could show that 
banks are unwilling to lend money because they think that there is too much risk in the 
system, or that individuals are unwilling to take out loans due to high interest rates. It is 
important to understand the limitations of this variable’s explanatory power to not infer 
misleading conclusions. 
CAt: Productive assets 
 
Just like the previous variable, CAt measures the quality of the balance sheet of 
the banks, but it does so in terms of the quality of the assets banks hold at a particular 
point in time. I define this variable in the same way it is defined in the original model, 
that is, as the proportion of assets that produce income and revenue for the financial 
institutions. Thus, the equation reads as follows: 
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where TPAt stands for the total nominal value of productive assets at time t and TAt as 
usual stands for the total nominal value of assets at time t in the system. Clearly, the 
higher this proportion, the better banks should be performing and thus, the system should 
be more stable.  
 
Figure 6: proportion of productive assets 
 
CVCt: Proportion of past-due loans 
 
Banks risk clients failing to repay their loans.. In the original model, this variable 
is defined as the proportion of loans that are late on their payments. Due to complications 
with the data and differences in the countries studied, I redefine the variable CVCt as the 
percentage of loans that have become past-due. This variable represents the percentage of 
loans that the bank considers as losses and does not expect to collect. This measure is 
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important for both dependent variables, because it captures the risk level in the economy. 
If the level of past-due loans goes up, there is a problem with the country’s economy, and 
vice versa. It is clear that the lower the value measured in this variable, the better it will 
be for the stability of the system. 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of Expired Loans 
EOt: Financial efficiency 
 
EOt portrays the level of financial efficiency in the system at a certain time t. The 
technical definition of the variable is the gross financial margin at time t (GFMt) over the 
total nominal value of income for the banks at time t (It). The equation is the following: 
+,! 
-./!
'!
 
This variable is critical to this analysis because financial efficiency is one of the 
most important aspects of financial stability. The more efficient the banks, the more 
stable the system in general -- or at least that is what should be expected.  
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Figure 8: Efficiency of the financial system 
 
The Data 
  
Data for both models was taken from the “Superintendencia de Bancos’” monthly 
reports 1 . This institution is in charge of regulation and oversight of all financial 
institutions in the country and, as such, it has monthly data from January 2000 onwards.  
For GDP 2  and oil prices 3 , I consulted the database “Indexmundi,” a database with 
information for most countries of the world. The models use monthly observations 
beginning in January 2000, and ending in September 2011.  
  
                                                             
1 See: 
http://www.sbs.gob.ec/practg/sbs_index?vp_art_id=29&vp_tip=2&vp_buscr=41#series2  
2 See: http://www.indexmundi.com/ecuador/  
3 See: http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=crude-oil&months=180  
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Chapter 4 Estimations and Results 
 
 In this chapter, I present the econometric models and show the results for the most 
important regressions. In addition, I describe and analyze the regressions and present 
conclusions. 
Zt Model Estimation 
 
In order to maintain consistency with the original model and to use it as a starting 
point, the first step I took in this analysis was to run the regression as presented in Pérez 
Hernández (2009) for the Dominican Republic. However, I assumed that the relationship 
between the independent and the dependent variables would be a linear one and thus 
removed the variable Ht2 from the regressions. 
 
Table 1: Original model Zt regression 1 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1929163   .2618762     0.74   0.463    -.3251374    .7109699
       gdpt1     .0168357   .0109327     1.54   0.126    -.0047918    .0384632
         eot     .0195691    .029019     0.67   0.501    -.0378373    .0769755
        cvct    -.9735594   .1887569    -5.16   0.000    -1.346966   -.6001533
        cirt    -.1768602   .0642818    -2.75   0.007     -.304025   -.0496955
          lt    -.1396157   .0611733    -2.28   0.024     -.260631   -.0186003
         cat     .1543321   .0755662     2.04   0.043     .0048441      .30382
          ht    -.1525108   .1232948    -1.24   0.218    -.3964172    .0913957
         zt1     .5191067   .0645606     8.04   0.000     .3913905    .6468229
                                                                              
          zt        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    3.34585054   139  .024070867           Root MSE      =  .02269
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9786
    Residual    .067417208   131  .000514635           R-squared     =  0.9799
       Model    3.27843333     8  .409804166           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  8,   131) =  796.30
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     140
. reg zt zt1 ht cat lt cirt cvct eot gdpt1
 47
Table 1 shows a large level of serial autocorrelation, as seen by the Durbin-Watson 
Statistic (DWS). The values for this statistic range from 0 to 4. The closer the statistic is 
to the extremes, the greater the serial correlation; the closer the statistic is to the value 2, 
the lower the serial autocorrelation. In the regression shown in table 1, the value of the 
DWS is 1.21666. An effective way to correct for this problem is to use the Cochrane-
Orcutt method of estimations. Table 2 shows the results of the regression ran with the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method: 
 
Table 2: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 
 
 
 
 The DWS has gone from 1.216666 to 2.074, which indicates that the serial 
autocorrelation has been addressed. Also, all the coefficients in the second table have 
statistically significant p-values, and thus could be included in the model. The adjusted 
R2 is also fairly high (.8238) and accurate since it is no longer a biased estimator. It is 
best to limit a time-series regression to five variables in order to show true correlation 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.073841
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.216666
                                                                              
         rho     .7124137
                                                                              
       _cons     .2982144   .2404435     1.24   0.217    -.1774403     .773869
       gdpt1     .0120469   .0075237     1.60   0.112    -.0028367    .0269305
         eot     .1552458   .0555309     2.80   0.006     .0453925    .2650992
        cvct     -1.55263   .1834089    -8.47   0.000    -1.915456   -1.189803
        cirt    -.1486158   .0603256    -2.46   0.015    -.2679542   -.0292774
          lt    -.2756882   .0861026    -3.20   0.002    -.4460197   -.1053566
         cat     .1263793   .0555818     2.27   0.025     .0164252    .2363335
          ht     .3682368   .1874551     1.96   0.052     -.002594    .7390677
                                                                              
          zt        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .346956893   138   .00251418           Root MSE      =  .02105
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8238
    Residual    .058033582   131  .000443004           R-squared     =  0.8327
       Model    .288923311     7  .041274759           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   131) =   93.17
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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and a model unburdened by noise. Thus, I decided to drop GDP from the equation 
because it is the variable with the worse p-value and is not significant at the 5 percent 
confidence level. Good practice suggests that if we are to drop a variable, it should be the 
one with the least statistical significance. Table 3 shows the regression without GDP. 
 
Table 3: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 2 
 
 
 
 The adjusted R2 dropped to .8184 and all coefficients, but one, are highly 
significant. In the case of Ht the p-value falls from .052 to .066. The DWS remains at a 
value close to 2 (2.081437) and the coefficients retain their signs. Since Ht is not 
significant at the 5 percent level of confidence, I ran another regression without including 
this variable. Table 4 shows these results: 
 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.081437
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.107798
                                                                              
         rho     .7159548
                                                                              
       _cons     .5597815   .1761423     3.18   0.002     .2113546    .9082084
         eot     .1509952   .0559998     2.70   0.008     .0402221    .2617682
        cvct    -1.574482   .1840192    -8.56   0.000     -1.93849   -1.210474
        cirt    -.1505553   .0605973    -2.48   0.014    -.2704227   -.0306878
          lt    -.2738557   .0866317    -3.16   0.002    -.4452219   -.1024896
         cat     .1401988   .0551116     2.54   0.012     .0311825     .249215
          ht     .3493496   .1882635     1.86   0.066    -.0230542    .7217533
                                                                              
          zt        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .340685422   138  .002468735           Root MSE      =  .02117
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8184
    Residual    .059167526   132  .000448239           R-squared     =  0.8263
       Model    .281517896     6  .046919649           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   132) =  104.68
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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Table 4: Zt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 3 
 
 
  
Clearly, the results in the table above are statistically better than those in Table 3. 
The value of the DWS is still around the value that is supposed to be, but the R2 value of 
the regression went up to .8464 meaning that the elimination of both variables increased 
the explanatory power of the other independent variables. Note that the elimination of the 
variables did not cause any change in signs of coefficients. Thus, with this final model 
84.64 percent of the variation in the financial stability index (Zt) can be explained by the 
variation in the ratio of productive assets (CAt) liquidity (Lt), change in the balance sheets 
of the banks (CIRt), proportion of past-due loans (CVCt), and financial efficiency (EOt).  
 
The final mathematical form for this model then reads as follows: 
1. 0!  12  1&$! 3 1)! 3 1&'(! 3 1&4&!  1+,!  5! 
For which the regression is the following: 
2. 6!  .81624 . 1249>?! 3 .291@! 3 .143>BC! 3 1.7820>F>!  .108GH! 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.063334
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.026226
                                                                              
         rho     .6796957
                                                                              
       _cons     .8162375   .1050761     7.77   0.000     .6084011    1.024074
         eot     .1081567   .0479521     2.26   0.026     .0133093     .203004
        cvct    -1.782032   .1442447   -12.35   0.000    -2.067343   -1.496722
        cirt     -.142987    .061276    -2.33   0.021    -.2641886   -.0217853
          lt    -.2907548   .0848748    -3.43   0.001    -.4586339   -.1228757
         cat     .1249052   .0550461     2.27   0.025     .0160261    .2337843
                                                                              
          zt        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .408854458   138  .002962713           Root MSE      =  .02134
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.8464
    Residual    .060544101   133  .000455219           R-squared     =  0.8519
       Model    .348310357     5  .069662071           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   133) =  153.03
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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Zt: Interpretation of results 
 
Zt is positively correlated with the ratio of productive assets (CAt) and financial 
efficiency (EOt) but negatively correlated with the variables liquidity (Lt), proportion of 
past-due loans (CVCt), and the balance sheets of banks (CIRt,). This means that if either 
CAt or EOt increase (which they have), ceteris paribus, the value for Zt will increase. On 
the other hand, if Lt, CIRt, or CVCt (the first two have decreased but the latter has 
increased) decrease, ceteris paribus the value of Zt will increase.  
 The coefficient associated with the ratio of productive assets (CAt) is positive. As 
this ratio increases, so does banking stability in Ecuador. These results are fairly self-
explanatory -- the larger the proportion of assets rendering income for the banks, the 
more stable individual banks will be, thus increasing the aggregate stability of the system. 
The same can be said for financial efficiency (EOt) -- an increase in the efficiency of the 
banks leads to less unresolved potential, thus more stability. Even though the sign is 
inversed, the explanation for the variable of the proportion of past-due loans (CVCt) is as 
straightforward as that of efficiency -- the higher the proportion the more unstable the 
system, and vice versa. 
 One of the coefficients that might be confusing at first glance is liquidity (Lt). In 
this model we see that as liquidity increases, banking stability decreases. This may seem 
counter-intuitive as the more liquidity there is the safer the banks are against a run on 
them. The problem is that when liquidity gets too high, banks are reluctant to lend money 
since bankers lack confidence on the stability of the financial system. Another confusing 
variable with a negative sign on its coefficient is the one that represents the balance 
sheets of the banks (CIRt). The negative sign suggests that as the ratio of total assets over 
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total liabilities increases, the stability of the financial system decreases. The explanation 
for this is similar to the reasoning behind that of liquidity, but this time the reluctance is 
voiced by the consumer. When assets are too high, banks need more deposits from 
individuals (liabilities) in order to keep expanding their business. When the ratio is too 
high, it suggests that consumers of the system do not trust the banks with their money or 
are spending too much and not saving enough. In both cases the balance between deposits 
and loans is broken and the stability of the system is jeopardized.  
 The coefficients explain by how much the value of Zt varies when the independent 
variable changes by one unit. For example, if the variable financial efficiency goes up by 
one percent, the value of Zt will go up by .108 percent. Similarly, if CVCt (proportion of 
past-due loans) falls by one percent, the index of financial stability will fall by 1.782 
percent. The same interpretation is important for all the other variables.  
NPLt:  Model Estimation 
 
NPL is intended to measure the risk level of the financial system in terms of credits, 
i.e. variables that affect the type and quality of assets held by a bank. As noted in chapter 
three, for the dependent variable NPLt I have redefined Pérez Hernández’s variable to 
show the actual financial risk in terms of the Ecuadorean market of credits. Table 5 
presents the original model with its redefined dependent variable. 
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Table 5: NPLt Original model 
 
 
 Similar to the previous model, the DWS is 1.05, which means that there is a 
problem of serial correlation. Table 6 presents the results of the regression ran with the 
Cochrane-Orcutt method: 
Table 6: NPL Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 1 
 
 
The regression in table 6 is considerably better and more accurate. The DWS went 
from 1.05 to 2.04, which is an acceptable value. In this case, though we have a very high 
adjusted R2 of .9857, we can see that some of the variables are not statistically 
significant, so I dropped GDP for  the same reasons as before. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -.2169882   .2069135    -1.05   0.296    -.6263418    .1923654
       gdpt1    -.0044784   .0033831    -1.32   0.188    -.0111714    .0022147
         eot     .0354884    .009264     3.83   0.000     .0171608    .0538161
        cvct     1.561745   .0735919    21.22   0.000     1.416152    1.707337
        cirt     .1203168   .0206707     5.82   0.000     .0794223    .1612114
          lt     .0436363   .0199582     2.19   0.031     .0041513    .0831213
         cat    -.0555822   .0230894    -2.41   0.017    -.1012618   -.0099026
        htht     -.633245   .5283564    -1.20   0.233    -1.678535     .412045
          ht     .7147956   .6116855     1.17   0.245     -.495351    1.924942
       nplt1     .0910318   .0320641     2.84   0.005     .0275968    .1544668
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    2.10327498   139  .015131475           Root MSE      =   .0071
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9967
    Residual     .00655833   130  .000050449           R-squared     =  0.9969
       Model    2.09671665     9  .232968517           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  9,   130) = 4617.93
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     140
. reg npl nplt1 ht htht cat lt cirt cvct eot gdpt1
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.040581
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    1.053264
                                                                              
         rho     .6121797
                                                                              
       _cons     .0191534   .0672446     0.28   0.776    -.1138724    .1521792
       gdpt1    -.0004636   .0022067    -0.21   0.834    -.0048289    .0039018
         eot      .012722    .013908     0.91   0.362    -.0147914    .0402355
        cvct     1.595359   .0496953    32.10   0.000      1.49705    1.693668
        cirt     .0610449   .0172856     3.53   0.001     .0268498    .0952401
          lt     .0276449   .0234394     1.18   0.240    -.0187239    .0740138
         cat    -.0422649   .0161577    -2.62   0.010    -.0742286   -.0103012
          ht    -.0704707     .04966    -1.42   0.158      -.16871    .0277685
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .331815854   138  .002404463           Root MSE      =  .00587
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9857
    Residual    .004518147   131   .00003449           R-squared     =  0.9864
       Model    .327297707     7  .046756815           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  7,   131) = 1355.68
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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Table 7: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 2 
 
 
Table 7 still shows improved results. Again, the results are good but there are 
variables that can be removed, in particular financial efficiency and liquidity. Table 8 
shows the results without financial efficiency, and Table 9 without liquidity. 
Table 8: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.042468
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.986458
                                                                              
         rho     .6145175
                                                                              
       _cons     .0094531   .0472662     0.20   0.842    -.0840441    .1029503
         eot     .0128225   .0138841     0.92   0.357    -.0146415    .0402866
        cvct     1.595932   .0494248    32.29   0.000     1.498164    1.693699
        cirt     .0609528   .0172059     3.54   0.001     .0269179    .0949876
          lt     .0274842   .0233686     1.18   0.242    -.0187411    .0737096
         cat    -.0427839   .0158638    -2.70   0.008    -.0741641   -.0114036
          ht    -.0699337    .049437    -1.41   0.160    -.1677249    .0278575
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .328235544   138  .002378518           Root MSE      =  .00585
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9856
    Residual    .004519631   132   .00003424           R-squared     =  0.9862
       Model    .323715913     6  .053952652           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  6,   132) = 1575.74
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.044701
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.856972
                                                                              
         rho      .619127
                                                                              
       _cons     .0350761   .0387129     0.91   0.367    -.0414965    .1116487
        cvct     1.564773   .0363752    43.02   0.000     1.492824    1.636722
        cirt     .0594146   .0171332     3.47   0.001     .0255259    .0933034
          lt     .0209095   .0223155     0.94   0.350    -.0232297    .0650486
         cat    -.0431624   .0158187    -2.73   0.007    -.0744512   -.0118736
          ht    -.0906076   .0443244    -2.04   0.043    -.1782795   -.0029357
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .321243196   138  .002327849           Root MSE      =  .00585
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9853
    Residual    .004548674   133  .000034201           R-squared     =  0.9858
       Model    .316694522     5  .063338904           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  5,   133) = 1851.98
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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Table 9: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation 4 
 
 
 With the aforementioned variables removed, the model appears to be properly 
specified, as there does not seem to be any confounding or extra variables in the model. 
In the last regression, 98.5 percent of the variation of the credit risk in the banking system 
of Ecuador (NPLt) can be explained by the variation of the concentration of the banking 
system (Ht), the proportion of productive assets (CAt), the quality of the balance sheet of 
banks (CIRt), and the proportion of past-due loans (CVCt). One thing to note about this 
model is that there appears to be a large degree of multicolinearity between some of the 
independent variables since,even though all the aforementioned variables are significant, 
CVCt appears to have an extraordinary influence on the dependent variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.027328
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.857653
                                                                              
         rho     .6234009
                                                                              
       _cons     .0470173   .0367407     1.28   0.203    -.0256494     .119684
        cvct     1.559457    .036001    43.32   0.000     1.488253    1.630661
        cirt     .0592299   .0171101     3.46   0.001     .0253891    .0930707
         cat    -.0458022   .0155155    -2.95   0.004    -.0764892   -.0151152
          ht    -.0950442   .0441568    -2.15   0.033    -.1823786   -.0077097
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .314839623   138  .002281447           Root MSE      =  .00585
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9850
    Residual    .004578564   134  .000034168           R-squared     =  0.9855
       Model    .310261059     4  .077565265           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  4,   134) = 2270.09
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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Table 10: NPLt Cochrane-Orcutt estimation 5 
 
 
 
 Table 10 shows the regression of NPLt as the dependent variable and only CVCt 
as the independent variable. Since CVCt represents the proportion of past-due loans, this 
variable is largely correlated with the credit risk of the system. That being said, I am 
reluctant to remove all the other variables from the equation because, theoretically, they 
are more helpful in understanding the stability of the financial system in terms of credit 
risk. Thus, because they are still clearly significant and carry strong theoretical 
explanatory power, I have also included them in the final model for NPLt. The final 
model for NPLt reads as follows: 
1. NPL  β2 3 βH 3 βCA  βCIR  βCVC  ε 
For which the estimated regression is: 
2. npl  .047 3. 095h 3 .0458ca  .0592cir  1.56cvc  
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 1.879340
Durbin-Watson statistic (original)    0.610324
                                                                              
         rho     .6720428
                                                                              
       _cons     .0156858   .0020073     7.81   0.000     .0117166    .0196551
        cvct     1.570058   .0199648    78.64   0.000     1.530579    1.609537
                                                                              
         npl        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    .247352419   138  .001792409           Root MSE      =  .00626
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9782
    Residual    .005360659   137  .000039129           R-squared     =  0.9783
       Model     .24199176     1   .24199176           Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       F(  1,   137) = 6184.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     139
Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression -- iterated estimates
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NPLt: Interpretation of results 
  
NPLt is negatively correlated with both Ht and CAt but  is positively correlated 
with CIRt and CVCt. These distinct correlations indicate that, as the degree of 
concentration of the financial system or the level of productive assets increases (both of 
which have increased), ceteris paribus, the level of credit risk drops. On the other hand, if 
the percentage of past-due loans or the ratio between total assets and total liabilities 
increases, so does the credit risk of the financial system. The coefficient in front of the 
banking system concentration variable suggests that as the concentration of the banking 
system increases by one percent, the credit risk decreases by .095 percent. This 
relationship suggests that the more concentrated the banks (meaning that banks are bigger 
and stronger), the greater the stability of the financial system. 
Conclusions 
  
The above analysis shows that the level of stability in the banking system of 
Ecuador is associated with, liquidity, the proportion of past-due loans, the balance sheets 
of the banks, financial efficiency, concentration of the banking system, and the ratio of 
productive assets. The more telling of the two models is Zt for it shows the system-wide 
risk of financial collapse. The NPL
 
model does not really tell us much that was not 
known before, but it is included here as a reminder of what determines the credit risk of 
the system.  
In this chapter I did not include dollarization directly as an independent variable. 
Two reasons dictated my decision. First, the available data did not enable me to measure 
the empirical effects of the dollarization on the economy of Ecuador. Second, and 
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possibly more important, dollarization is not just one more independent variable to 
consider. Dollarization, as it pertains to this analysis, is the main context variable that has 
affected the financial system.  
In the following chapter I explain the effects of dollarization on the previously 
considered independent variables. I hope that by the end of next chapter, the link between 
dollarization and the banking system will be understood. For now, however, it suffices to 
say that the banking system of Ecuador has become vastly more stable and that this 
stability is significantly correlated with the variables presented in this analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Effect of the Dollarization on the Banking System 
 
What is the relationship between the stability and strength of the financial system 
in Ecuador and dollarization in 2000? This question is the one I intend to tackle in this 
chapter. But how do I answer this question? Due to the collapse of the currency in 2000, 
there is little information (economic, banking, and financial) before the dollarization was 
introduced. Thus, it is impossible to conduct an econometric analysis on how 
dollarization affected the dependent variables. In their paper “Dollarization: Analytical 
Issues,” Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco relied on theory to evaluate the dollarization 
process. They claim that because there have been very little cases of dollarized countries, 
and all of them had been carried out fairly recently (especially when they wrote their 
paper), they decided to rely on a theoretical approach to evaluate the effects of the 
dollarization process (Chang & Velasco, 2001). Thus, in the absence of data and 
following their example, I also use a theoretical approach to explain the link between 
dollarization and the stability of the financial system.  
The estimations in chapter 4 for the post-dollarization period are relevant because 
they show that the financial system has gained stability. It is easier to explain the effects 
of dollarization on the independent variables after having identified and estimated a 
stability model. Since each independent variable is more narrowly defined, it is possible 
to analyze how dollarization would affect each one, rather than the more aggregate and 
complex outcome of financial stability. In this regard I follow the contributions to the 
literature of Sebastian Edwards, Igal Magendzo, Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco, 
Sofia Castillo, and rest of authors mentioned in chapter 1.  
According to the literature, four main positive effects can be identified:  
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1. A statistically significant reduction of inflation from hyperinflation in the 1990’s 
to one-digit inflation all throughout the 2000’s;   
2. Elimination of the Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) as the role of the Central Bank. 
With dollarization, the Central Bank’s function is reduced to a regulatory 
institution. It does not have the power to rescue and bailout underperforming 
banks, thus reducing the moral hazard problem bankers face. This creates better 
management in banks and increases financial efficiency; 
3. Dollarization builds credibility on the regulatory institutions. With a Central Bank 
and the “Superintendencia de bancos” that have the critical and basic role of 
regulating the system, it is easier for the institutions to build credibility both 
nationally and internationally. Dollarization also eliminates the time-
inconsistency problem and the Central Bank has to adhere to a consistent 
monetary policy, further building credibility and reliability; 
4. Dollarization eliminates currency risk. By adopting a larger and more powerful 
currency, investors will no longer fear that depreciation will diminish their assets. 
Dollarization and its Effect on the Independent Variables 
  
Economists agree that there are intrinsic benefits in dollarization, as it may enable the 
creation of financial stability. The literature has focused on dollarization for overall 
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and economic growth, but few studies have 
analyzed specific sectors such as banking. Hence, my main contribution to the literature, 
is developing a banking model applicable to the post-dollarization era and analyzing how 
dollarization affected the independent variables in the model. 
 60
Dollarization has stabilized prices and increased international trade 
 
Perhaps one of the most studied consequences of adopting a foreign currency as a 
legal tender is the effect on macroeconomic variables, predominantly GDP. The views on 
this subject are divided, and thus I cannot claim that GDP growth is generated directly by 
dollarization. What I can argue, however, is that dollar adoption (along with increase in 
oil price) has brought about a tremendous level of macroeconomic stability to Ecuador. 
Combined with the irrefutable decrease in inflation4, business opportunities have grown 
and attracted foreign direct investment. Another positive effect engendered by 
dollarization is that, since 2000, the dollar has depreciated in terms of other international 
currencies. This means that Ecuadorean exports to other international actors (not the 
United States) have become cheaper, which induces greater international trade. In fact, 
one of the most debated topics in the country right now is the creation of a free trade 
agreement with the European Union that would alleviate the dominance of the United 
States on the Ecuadorean market for exports.  
Dollarization eliminates currency risk, attracts foreign direct investment and increases 
the likelihood of granting loans both to Ecuadorean firms and to the Ecuadorean 
government. This reality, however, has not developed in Ecuador yet. The political risk 
associated with Rafael Correa’s regime and the “socialism of the 21st Century” he 
promotes, has scared away potential investors. Furthermore, the rapid growths of 
Colombia, Peru, and Brazil, coupled with the small local economy size have reduced 
international interest in Ecuador and dollarization has not played a significant factor at 
                                                             
4 Adoption of the dollar automatically stops hyperinflation and re-introduces stability to 
prices. With price stability the economy can go back to conducting business with stable 
expectations 
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the macroeconomic level. It is fair to say, however, that in recent years, Ecuador has 
created a different set of international allies signing free trade agreements with Iran and 
accepting a large amount of loans from the Chinese government. 
The adoption of the US dollar means that prices in the United States affect domestic 
consumption in Ecuador in absence of an exchange rate regime. Ecuadorean tradables 
cannot compete with manufactures of the United States and agricultural products, so the 
market has been inundated with these products.  
Dollarization Increases banking intermediation 
 
Due to currency risk elimination and drastic inflation reduction, banks hold less cash 
and are able to meet their lending and investment operations. Before dollarization, banks 
used to make loans at really high interest rates, or make dollar loans in order to overcome 
the risk of the sucre depreciating or risk inflation. Also, banks would make 
predominantly short-term loans in order to avoid default. 
 In reality, we see a decrease in the amount of liquidity in the market from early 
2000 (in April, the liquidity of the financial system was at 40 percent) to June 2011 when 
liquidity dropped to 29 percent of assets having passed through a low of 20 percent some 
years back. Short-term loans, on the other hand, have increased and still dominate the 
market for loans in the country.   
Dollarization leads to greater concentration 
  
In order for banks to be able to survive dollarization and for dollarization to be 
effective, the banking system has to write-off underperforming loans. In other words, 
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banks have to be strong and large to absorb losses. Banks that are not robust enough to 
deal with the crises fail and go bankrupt. This was clearly the case in Ecuador when 
about 70 percent of financial institutions collapsed by the end of the crisis that led to 
dollarization. Banks that survived-the four largest banks in particular- are strong enough 
to withstand the harshest of environments. 
One of the main effects of dollarization on the banking system has been to diminish, 
if not totally remove, the capacity of any one institution within the country -- including 
the government -- to act as LOLR.  Whether this is good or bad is often disputed, but in 
the case of Ecuador it was probably a good thing. Most economists agree that with the 
disappearance of an institution to act as LOLR, the presence of oversight and strong 
management becomes critical. Banks know that if they decide to accept very risky 
projects and they fail, there is no institution to bail them out and would go under if their 
losses are too large.  
The sword is a double-edged weapon because a banking crisis can be very costly, and 
the last crisis cost Ecuador 22 percent of its GDP. The inability of the Central Bank to 
bailout a bank reduces the moral hazard problem of time-inconsistency, thus forcing the 
banking system to be more credible and responsible. This condition helps explain the 
increasing trend towards the greater concentration of banks throughout the last decade. 
Thus, dollarization has meant that only the best banks in the system have survived and 
now operate more efficiently. 
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Dollarization increases banking productivity and efficiency 
 
 The most important dollarization effect is the reduction of moral hazard caused by 
the LOLR practice. With the elimination of the LOLR practice, banks have to scrutinize 
their assets more rigorously and can no longer lend money expecting that if something 
goes wrong, the Central Bank will bail them out to avoid a financial crisis. Furthermore, 
banks have to get better managers and plan ahead in order to survive in the new system.  
 With better management and greater oversight, the proportions of productive bank 
assets and of past-due loans have improved. In the past decade, the ratio of productive 
assets went from about 60 percent in mid-2000 to just below 90 percent in mid-2011. 
Moreover, the ratio of past-due loans went from around 20 percent in the crises years 
until the end of 2000 to below five percent in 2011.  
Most economists agree that dollarization improves financial efficiency through 
the loss of LOLR as it directly engenders a vast increase in financial efficiency. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the dollarization process in Ecuador triggered the 
failure of those banks that were not efficient enough to survive.  
It is clear from the data that the financial efficiency of banks in Ecuador has 
vastly increased in the last ten years. The measure for financial efficiency has gone up 
from between zero and ten percent in the first months of the year 2000 to right above 
seventy percent in the later months of 2011. Furthermore, the recent proliferation of 
smaller financial institutions shows that a larger percentage of the market has some sort 
of access to the banking system through both microfinance and credit agencies that focus 
on micro loans as well.  
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Dollarization improves the balance sheets of banks 
 
The drastic inflation drop created by dollarization improves the balance sheets of 
banks. A decrease in inflation promotes saving rather than immediately spending money. 
Depositors are no longer afraid of putting their money in banks and having the value of 
their savings drastically diminished the next month. Banks are able to reduce 
significantly the passive interest they pay depositors, thus making it less expensive for 
them to leverage capital. As a result, banks can lower the active interest rates they charge 
to lenders making it easier for them to find clients willing to take out a loan.  
Impact of Oil Prices on Banking Stability 
 
There are other variables worth examining. The price of oil has increased 
considerably since the mid-2000s and has brought a lot of money into Ecuador that could 
be promoting stability in all sectors. Similarly, a seemingly politically stable period since 
the election of President Rafael Correa could be considered another important context 
variable. Correa is the only president since the election of Sixto Durán Ballén in 1992 to 
finish his mandate in office. Due to popular upheaval, previous presidents failed to 
complete their constitutional mandates. This was true for Abdalá Bucarám, Jamil 
Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez, who were elected and later ousted from office. The first 
argument is further explored in this section, but the second one I do not discuss because 
arguments are vastly speculative. 
It has been suggested, therefore, that the sharp increase in oil prices throughout 
the last decade has helped promote growth and financial stability throughout Ecuador, as 
seen in the graph below: 
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Conclusion 
 
The transitive property in mathematics states that if A is equal to B and B is equal 
to C, then A is equal to C. The analysis conducted in this chapter carries the same logic. 
If dollarization affects the independent variables, and the independent variables explain 
the dependent variables, then it can be said that the dependent variables are affected or 
explained by dollarization.  
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Conclusions 
 
The purpose of my thesis is to study the factors that affect the stability of the banking 
system in Ecuador and to assess the role of dollarization. Taking as the starting point the 
two models presented by Luisa Erika Pérez Hernández (2009), I conducted a time-series 
econometric analysis to identify the relationships between the banking stability of the 
country and the selected independent variables. The two dependent variables were Z and 
NPL. Z explains the level of financial stability within the system, and NPL
 
gauges the 
credit risk of the banking system. The original independent variables were GDP, 
liquidity, financial efficiency, the proportion of productive assets, the percentage of past-
due loans, the ratio between total assets and total liabilities, and the degree of 
concentration of the banking sector. The final estimated models are presented below: 
1. Z  β2  βCA 3 βL 3 βCIR 3 βCVC  βEO  ε 
a. z  .81624 . 1249ca 3 .291l 3 .143cir 3 1.7820cvc  .108eo 
2. NPL  β2 3 βH 3 βCA  βCIR  βCVC  ε 
a. npl  .047 3. 095h 3 .0458ca  .0592cir  1.56cvc 
My study shows that the stability of Ecuador’s banking system is highly 
correlated with the independent variables specified above. Furthermore, because of the 
improvements in all of the variables shown in chapter 3, it is clear that the financial 
system has become vastly more stable. 
Chapter 5 contributes a theoretical discussion on the effects of dollarization on the 
independent variables. I show that through the four main benefits of dollarization on a 
small, open, and developing economy, the values of the independent variables have 
improved. The four main effects of dollarization on an economy are: i) the statistically 
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significant decrease in inflation, ii) the removal of the figure of the Lender of Last Resort, 
iii) the removal of currency risk, and iv) the increased credibility of regulatory 
institutions. These positive effects are proven to have a direct connection to the 
independent variables, and thus to the dependent variables portraying financial stability. 
 During the analysis of dollarization and banking stability in Ecuador, I faced 
several problems. First, there is no data to conduct an econometric study on dollarization 
and the banking system. Hence, my first recommendation to improve and strengthen the 
econometric model is to find data for the 1990s and analyze how the banking sector was 
doing before the dollarization and how it is doing now.  The problem with this 
recommendation is that the data prior to the dollarization cannot be compared to that of 
post-dollarization without omitting important factors like inflation. 
 The second major improvement that would greatly benefit this analysis, but at the 
same time make it more complex, would be to use cross-section data for all the banks, or 
for a representative sample of banks throughout the period of analysis. This comparison 
would provide an accurate and demonstrative picture of the reality of the country. I could 
not do this because of my limited understanding of econometrics and the techniques used.  
 Lastly, it would help to go over the variable specification in order to be able to 
link dollarization to each independent variable. Furthermore, if it were possible to 
establish the econometric significance of dollarization on each of the dependent variables, 
it would demonstrate the effects the dollarizing an economy would have in the well-being 
of its banking system and its society. 
With the above suggestions in mind, it is important to emphasize the contribution 
of my analysis. It represents a first step to understanding the effects of dollarization both 
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in the Ecuadorean banking system and on that of any country that either is dollarized or is 
thinking of dollarizing. Very few analyses have been conducted on the effects of 
dollarization on specific sectors, such as banking. The intrinsic understanding of such 
effects allows governments and citizens to make better-informed decisions. There are 
trade-offs when adopting a drastic measure for an economy, and it is important to 
recognize that what may be good for some sectors may not be good for others. It is 
therefore necessary to understand all the policy implications in order to reduce the 
likelihood of negative unexpected consequences.  
 More specific to this analysis, it is clear that dollarization has substantial potential 
benefits for the banking sector of an economy. Hence, a deep understanding of the exact 
repercussions of dollarization is required. My analysis is case-specific and it focuses on 
the economy of Ecuador only, showing that, for this country, dollarization did indeed 
help the banking sector. Economists suggest this type of analysis as necessary to discuss 
the particular effects of policy implementation. Also, this analysis shows that if nothing 
else, dollarization has allowed the development of a banking system that is now more 
stable and better prepared to face the challenges that will come in the future. 
 Some economists, including President Rafael Correa, argue that dollarization of 
the Ecuadorean economy was not a good thing; that the loss of sovereignty and monetary 
policy were detrimental to the country.  Bu at least from the banks’ point of view, 
dollarization has been nothing but beneficial to the country. Reversing it would only 
increase instability and risk in an economy that already has enough of both.  
 70
Works Cited 
 
Alvarez-Plata, P., & García-Herrero, P. (2007, September). To dollarize or de- 
dollarize: Consequences for Monetary Policy. Paper Prepared for the Asian 
Development Bank . 
 
Beckerman, P. (n.d.). Dollarization and Semi-Dollarization In Ecuador. World Bank. 
Chang, R., & Velasco, A. (2001, April). Dollarization: Analytical Issues. NBER 
and Harvard University . Cambridge, MA, United States. 
 
Castillo, S. (2006, April). Dollarization and Macroeconomic Stability in Latin  
America. Oshkosh, Wisconsin: Oshkosh Scholar, Volume 1: University of 
Wisconsin, Oshkosh 
 
Correa, R. (2008). Ecuador: de Banana Republic a la No Republica. Bogotá,  
Colombia: Random House Mondadori, S.A. 
 
Dirección General de Estudios. (2010). La Economía Ecuatoriana Luego de 10 Años  
de Dolarización. Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador: Banco Central del Ecuador. 
 
Edwards, S. (2001, May). Dollarization and Economic Performance: An Empirical  
Investigation. NBER Working Paper Series . Cambridge, MA, United States: 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Edwards, S. (1994) II. The Political Economy of Inflation and Stabilization in  
Developing Countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change , 42 (2), 
235-236. 
 
Edwards, S., & Magendzo, I. (2003, July). Strict Dollarization and Economic  
Performance: An Empirical Investigation. NBER Working Paper Series . 
Cambridge, MA, United States: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (2001, January). What Problems Can Dollarization Solve. Prepared  
for an ASSA Oanel on dollarization . California, United States: University of 
California, Berkely. 
 
Falconí-Benítez, F. (2001). Integrated Assessment of the Recent Economic History of  
Ecuador. Population and Environment , 22 (3), 257-280. 
 
Gale, D., & Vives, X. (2002). Dollarization, Bailouts, and the Stability of the Banking  
System. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 117 (2), 467-502. 
 
Hausmann, R., & Powell, A. (n.d.). Dollarization: Issues of Implementation.  
Available at: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/98690444/Dollarization-issues-of-
implementation-Introduction  
 71
Henderson, P. (1997). Cocoa, FInance and the State in Ecuador, 1895-1925. Bulletin  
of Latin American Research , 16 (2), 169-186. 
 
Hurtado, O., Chiu, P., Torre de la, A., Fernández, M., Lousteau, M., & Pachano, A.  
(2001). Los Desafíos de la Dolarización Para el Ecuador. Quito, Pichincha, 
Ecuador: CORDES. 
 
Jácome H., L. I. (2004, January). The Late 1990s Financial Crisis in Ecuador:  
Institutional Weaknesses, Fiscal Rigidities, and Financial Dollarization at Work. 
IMF Working Papers . International Monetary Fund. 
 
Jameson, K. P. (2004). Dollarization in Ecuador: A Post-Keynesian Institutionalist  
Analysis. Department of Economics Working Paper Series . Salt Lake City,  
Utah, United States: University of Utah. 
 
Jameson, K. P. (2001, September 7). Dollarization: Wave of the Future or Flight to  
the Past. Washington, D.C: Meetings of the Latin American Studies Association. 
 
Krugman, P. (2009). The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008.  
New Yok, NY. W.W Norton & Company 
 
Lucio-Paredes, P. (2010). Ecuador: de la No República... a la No República. Quito,  
Pichincha, Ecuador: Trama. 
 
Naranjo, M. P. (2000). Hacia la dolarización Oficial en El Ecuador. Quito,  
Pichincha, Ecuador: Banco Central del Ecuador. 
 
Pérez Hérnandez, L. E. (2009). Competencia y Estabilidad en el Sistema Bancario:  
Evidencia para la República Dominicana. Tesis de Magíster . Santiago, Chile: 
Pontífica Universidad Católica de Chile, Instituto de Economía. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
